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Although minor improvements like #1132 (comment) (as described at https://discuss.kde.org/t/why-doesnt-kde-su-provide-invocation-info-like-policykit-does/5884/4?u=rokejulianlockhart) would certainly be a minor improvement to initial permission elevation necessary when invoking YaST, it doesn't remediate its fundamental mismanagement of the permission granted to it: YaST should request permission from the superuser (or any other user) solely when it's performing an action in which such permission is necessary, not a second before.
This isn't security theatre nor unnecessary hardening, it has tangible benefits for every user:
The appearance configuration would be respected when using YasT
This might appear as if it's a minor consideration, but it would be a very, very significant boon for accessibility. For instance, I find non-monospace fonts less legible, and light pages at night really quite painful. Because my font and colouration configuration obviously don't carry over to the superuser's account unless manually synchronized, I must indeed manually duplicate my preferences over there.
No auth necessary for non-privileged actions
Authentication wouldn't be necessary to view data that isn't protected by a higher authority, nor would it even be necessary to launch the application. This would provide more non-dangerous tools to unprivileged users on a corporate (or personal) system.
PolicyKit
Because this would be a brilliant time to move to PolicyKit (per the aforementioned Add a policykit policy that allows yast to run via pkexec #1132 (comment)) it would provide the user with obvious confirmation that each time they provide permission for an action, it's actually for that action.
Currently, it's the difference between
and
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
The main development team behind YaST (which includes me) is aware of the issue and I personally share your view and would like to move to a more modern approach.
That been said, I don't see that happening in the short term if it depends on the current development team. We have MANY tasks with higher priority in our to-do list. But we are of course open to collaboration if someone is brave enough to open that can of worms.
RokeJulianLockhart
changed the title
Request root access when performing elevated action, not to run entire application.
Request superuser access solely when performing elevated action, rather than to run entire app.
Jul 24, 2024
Although minor improvements like #1132 (comment) (as described at https://discuss.kde.org/t/why-doesnt-kde-su-provide-invocation-info-like-policykit-does/5884/4?u=rokejulianlockhart) would certainly be a minor improvement to initial permission elevation necessary when invoking YaST, it doesn't remediate its fundamental mismanagement of the permission granted to it: YaST should request permission from the superuser (or any other user) solely when it's performing an action in which such permission is necessary, not a second before.
This isn't security theatre nor unnecessary hardening, it has tangible benefits for every user:
The appearance configuration would be respected when using YasT
This might appear as if it's a minor consideration, but it would be a very, very significant boon for accessibility. For instance, I find non-monospace fonts less legible, and light pages at night really quite painful. Because my font and colouration configuration obviously don't carry over to the superuser's account unless manually synchronized, I must indeed manually duplicate my preferences over there.
No auth necessary for non-privileged actions
Authentication wouldn't be necessary to view data that isn't protected by a higher authority, nor would it even be necessary to launch the application. This would provide more non-dangerous tools to unprivileged users on a corporate (or personal) system.
PolicyKit
Because this would be a brilliant time to move to PolicyKit (per the aforementioned Add a policykit policy that allows yast to run via pkexec #1132 (comment)) it would provide the user with obvious confirmation that each time they provide permission for an action, it's actually for that action.
Currently, it's the difference between
and
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: