feat: add custom codeql queries

.github/workflows/codeql.yaml

@@ -35,14 +35,15 @@ jobs:
     - name: Setup go
       uses: actions/setup-go@v5
       with:
-        go-version: '1.21'
+        go-version: '1.21.0'
         check-latest: true
     - name: Checkout repository
       uses: actions/checkout@v4
     - name: Initialize CodeQL
       uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
       with:
         languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
+        queries: ./codeql/
     - name: Autobuild
       uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v3
     - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis

codeql/addipamconfig-to-exec.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * @name Command Injection From CNS ipam add result / CNS multitenancy ipam add result
+ * @description Flow exists from CNS ipam add result / CNS multitenancy ipam add result (untrusted) to exec command
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @id go/cmd-inject-ipam-add-result
+ * @tags security
+ * @security-severity 9.8
+ * @precision high
+ */
+
+// Detect inputs from CNS add ipam result / CNS multitenancy ipam add result to command injection
+import go
+
+private class Sink extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Sink() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "CommandContext") and
+      (c.getArgument(2) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+      or
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "Command") and
+      (c.getArgument(0) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private class Source extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Source() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c, Method m |
+      //m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "NetPlugin",
+      //  "addIpamInvoker") or // this is not necessary since we call GetAllNetworkContainers right next to this = duplicated results, but if this call moves, uncomment this
+      m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "Multitenancy",
+        "GetAllNetworkContainers") and
+      c = m.getACall() and
+      c.getResult(0) = this
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module MyConfiguration implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+}
+
+module Flow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfiguration>;
+
+import Flow::PathGraph
+
+from Flow::PathNode source, Flow::PathNode sink
+where Flow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "potential command injection"

codeql/cni-args-to-exec.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/**
+ * @name Command Injection From CNI Args
+ * @description Flow exists from CNI Args (untrusted) to exec command
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @id go/cmd-inject-cni
+ * @tags security
+ * @security-severity 9.8
+ * @precision high
+ */
+
+// Detect inputs from CNI ARGS to command injection
+import go
+
+private class Sink extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Sink() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "CommandContext") and
+      (c.getArgument(2) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+      or
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "Command") and
+      (c.getArgument(0) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private class Source extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Source() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c, Method m |
+      (
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "NetPlugin",
+          "Add") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "NetPlugin",
+          "Delete") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "NetPlugin",
+          "Update") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cni/network", "NetPlugin",
+          "Get")
+      ) and
+      c = m.getACall() and
+      c.getArgument(0) = this
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module MyConfiguration implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+}
+
+module Flow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfiguration>;
+
+import Flow::PathGraph
+
+from Flow::PathNode source, Flow::PathNode sink
+where Flow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "potential command injection"

codeql/cns-invoker-to-exec.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * @name Command Injection From CNS Invoker
+ * @description Flow exists from CNS Invoker (untrusted) to exec command
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @id go/cmd-inject-cns-invoker
+ * @tags security
+ * @security-severity 9.8
+ * @precision high
+ */
+
+// Detect inputs from CNS Invoker to command injection
+// Does not detect flow to outside the enclosed method (which is why we analyze addIpamInvoker's results too)
+import go
+
+private class Sink extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Sink() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "CommandContext") and
+      (c.getArgument(2) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+      or
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "Command") and
+      (c.getArgument(0) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private class Source extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Source() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c, Method m |
+      (
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cns/client", "Client",
+          "RequestIPs") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cns/client", "Client",
+          "RequestIPAddress") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cns/client", "Client",
+          "GetNetworkContainer") or
+        m.hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/cns/client", "Client",
+          "GetAllNetworkContainers")
+      ) and
+      c = m.getACall() and
+      c.getResult(0) = this
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module MyConfiguration implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+}
+
+module Flow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfiguration>;
+
+import Flow::PathGraph
+
+from Flow::PathNode source, Flow::PathNode sink
+where Flow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "potential command injection"

codeql/codeql-pack.lock.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+lockVersion: 1.0.0
+dependencies: {}
+compiled: false

codeql/decode-to-exec.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * @name Command Injection From Decode
+ * @description Flow exists from decodes (untrusted) to exec command
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @id go/cmd-inject-decode
+ * @tags security
+ * @security-severity 9.8
+ * @precision high
+ */
+
+// Detect flow from the DECODE method (which decodes http requests) to a command execution
+import go
+
+private class Sink extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Sink() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "CommandContext") and
+      (c.getArgument(2) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+      or
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("os/exec", "Command") and
+      (c.getArgument(0) = this or c.getArgument(1) = this)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private class Source extends DataFlow2::Node {
+  Source() {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("github.com/Azure/azure-container-networking/common", "Decode") and
+      c.getArgument(2) = this
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module MyConfiguration implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof Sink }
+
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof Source }
+}
+
+module Flow = TaintTracking::Global<MyConfiguration>;
+
+import Flow::PathGraph
+
+from Flow::PathNode source, Flow::PathNode sink
+where Flow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "potential command injection"

codeql/qlpack.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+library: false
+warnOnImplicitThis: false
+name: codeql
+version: 0.0.1
+dependencies:
+  codeql/go-all: ^1.1.3