A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction library.
The VCG Auction is the most economically efficient auction format. It encourages truthful bidding by only charging bidders their externality—the value of the best alternative outcome had the bidder not participated. In its exact form, it’s a combinatorial auction that is computationally hard to compute for large problem sizes. Nevertheless, small problems are certainly possible to compute by exhaustive search, and that's what this library currently supports.
There's many computationally-feasible simulations of the VCG auction that can scale better for practical use cases, like the Simultaneous Ascending Auction used for wireless spectrum allocation.
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